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ABSTRACT
The Onion Name System:
Tor-powered Distributed DNS
for Tor Hidden Services
by
Jesse Victors, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2015
Major Professor: Dr. Ming Li
Department: Computer Science
Tor hidden services are anonymous servers of unknown location and ownership who
can be accessed through any Tor-enabled web browser. They have gained popularity over
the years, but still suffer from major usability challenges due to their cryptographically-
generated non-memorable addresses. In response to this difficulty, in this work we intro-
duce the Onion Name System (OnioNS), a privacy-enhanced distributed DNS that allows
users to reference a hidden service by a meaningful globally-unique verifiable domain name
chosen by the hidden service operator. We introduce a new distributed self-healing pub-
lic ledger and construct OnioNS as an optional backwards-compatible plugin for Tor on
top of existing hidden service infrastructure. We simplify our design and threat model
by embedding OnioNS within the Tor network and provide mechanisms for authenticated
denial-of-existence with minimal networking costs. Our reference implementation demon-
strates that OnioNS successfully addresses the major usability issue that has been with Tor
hidden services since their introduction in 2002.
(73 pages)
vPUBLIC ABSTRACT
The Onion Name System:
Tor-powered Distributed DNS for Tor Hidden Services
Jesse M. Victors
The Tor network is a third-generation onion router that aims to provide private and
anonymous Internet access to its users. In recent years its userbase, network, and com-
munity have grown significantly in response to revelations of national and global electronic
surveillance, and it remains one of the most popular anonymity networks in use today. Tor
also provides access to anonymous servers known as hidden services – servers of unknown
location and ownership that may provide websites, chat services, or an electronic dead drop.
These hidden services can be accessed through any Tor-powered web browser but they suffer
from usability challenges due to the algorithmic generation of their addresses.
In response to this difficulty, in this work we introduce the Onion Name System
(OnioNS), a privacy-enhanced distributed DNS that allows hidden service operators to
select a globally-unique domain name for their service. We construct OnioNS as an op-
tional backwards-compatible plugin for Tor on top of existing hidden service infrastructure
and utilize the existing Tor network, which minimizes our assumptions and simplifies our
threat model. Additionally, OnioNS allows clients to verify the authenticity or nonexistence
of domain names with minimal networking costs without introducing any central authority.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Onion Routing
As the prevalence of the Internet and other communication has grown, so too has
the development and usage of privacy-enhancing systems. These are tools and protocols
that provide privacy by obfuscating the link between a user’s identification or location and
their communications. Privacy is not achieved in traditional Internet connections because
SSL/TLS encryption cannot hide IP and TCP headers, which must be exposed to allow
routing between two parties; eavesdroppers can easily break user privacy by monitoring
these headers [3]. A closely related property is anonymity – a part of privacy where user
activities cannot be tracked and their communications are indistinguishable from others.
Tools that provide these systems hold a user’s identity in confidence, and privacy and
anonymity are often provided together. Following a general distrust of unsecured Internet
communications and in light of the 2013-current revelations by Edward Snowden of Internet
mass-surveillance by the NSA, GCHQ, and other members of the Five Eyes, users have in-
creasingly turned to these tools for their own protection. Privacy-enhancing and anonymity
tools may also be used by the military, researchers working in sensitive topics, journalists,
law enforcement running tip lines, activists and whistleblowers, or individuals in countries
with Internet censorship. These users may turn to proxies or VPNs, but these tools of-
ten track their users for liability reasons and thus rarely provide anonymity. Furthermore,
they can easily voluntarily or be forced to break confidence to destroy user privacy. More
complex tools are needed for a stronger guarantee of privacy and anonymity.
Today, most anonymity tools descend from mixnets, an early anonymity system in-
vented by David Chaum in 1981 [4]. In a mixnet, user messages are transmitted to one
or more mixes, who each partially decrypt, scramble, delay, and retransmit the messages
2to other mixes or to the final destination. This enhances privacy by heavily obscuring the
correlation between the origin, destination, and contents of the messages. Mixnets have in-
spired the development of many varied mixnet-like protocols and have generated significant
literature within the field of network security [5] [6].
Mixnet descendants can generally be classified into two distinct categories: high-latency
and low-latency systems. High-latency networks typically delay traffic packets and are no-
table for their greater resistance to global adversaries who monitor communication entering
and exiting the network. However, high-latency networks, due to their slow speed, are typ-
ically not suitable for common Internet activities such as web browsing, instant messaging,
or the prompt transmission of email. Low-latency networks, by contrast, do not delay pack-
ets and are thus more suited for these activities, but they are more vulnerable to timing
attacks from global adversaries [7]. In this work, we detail and introduce new functionality
within low-latency protocols.
Onion routing is a technique for enhancing privacy of TCP-based communication across
a network and is the most popular low-latency descendant of mixnets in use today. It was
first designed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in 1997 for military applications [8] [9]
but has since seen widespread usage. In onion routing with public key infrastructure (PKI),
a user selects a set network nodes, typically called onion routers and together a circuit, and
encrypts the message with the public key of each router. Each encryption layer contains the
next destination for the message – the last layer contains the message’s final destination.
As the cell containing the message travels through the network, each of these onion routers
in turn decrypt their encryption layer like an onion, exposing their share of the routing
information. The final recipient receives the message from the last router, but is never
exposed to the message’s source [6]. The sender therefore has privacy because the recipient
does not know the sender’s location, and the sender has anonymity if no identifiable or
distinguishing information is included in their message.
3Figure 1.1: An example cell and message encryption in an onion routing scheme. Each router
“peels” off its respective layer of encryption; the final router exposes the final destination.
1.2 Tor
Tor is a third-generation onion routing system. It was invented in 2002 by Roger
Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson of the Free Haven Project and the U.S.
Naval Research Laboratory [7] and is the most popular onion router in use today. Tor
inherited many of the concepts pioneered by earlier onion routers and implemented several
key changes: [6] [7]
• Perfect forward secrecy: Rather than distributing keys via onion layers, Tor clients
negotiate ephemeral symmetric encryption keys with each of the routers in turn,
extending the circuit one router at a time. Each router remembers its respective key
and can re-encrypts responses as it travels backwards up the circuit to the client,
who then unwraps all the layers. These keys are then purged when the circuit is torn
down; this achieves perfect forward secrecy, a property that ensures that the session
encryption keys will not be revealed if long-term public keys are later compromised.
• Circuit isolation: Second-generation onion routers mixed cells from different circuits
in real-time, but later research could not justify this as an effective defense against an
active adversary [6]. Tor abandoned this in favor of isolating circuits from each other
inside the network, although it recycles TCP/IP links between routers.
• Three-hop circuits: Previous onion routers used long circuits to provide heavy
traffic mixing. Tor removed mixing and fell back to using short circuits of minimal
4length. With three relays involved in each circuit, the first router (the guard) is
exposed to the user’s IP address. The middle router passes onion cells between the
guard and the final router (the exit) and its encryption layer exposes it to neither
the user’s IP nor its traffic. The exit processes user traffic, but is unaware of the
origin of the requests. While the choice of middle and exits can be routers can be
safely random, the guard must be chosen once and then consistently used to avoid a
large cumulative chance of leaking the user’s IP to an attacker. This is of particular
importance for circuits from hidden services [10] [11].
• Standardized to SOCKS proxy: Tor simplified the multiplexing pipeline by transi-
tioning from application-level proxies (HTTP, FTP, email, etc) to a TCP-level SOCKS
proxy, which multiplexed user traffic and DNS requests through the onion circuit re-
gardless of any higher protocol. The disadvantage to this approach is that Tor’s client
software has less capability to cache data and strip identifiable information out of a
protocol. The countermeasure was the Tor Browser, a fork of Mozilla’s open-source
Firefox with a focus on security and privacy. To reduce the risks of users breaking
their privacy through Javascript, it ships with the NoScript extension which blocks
all web scripts not explicitly whitelisted. The browser also forces all web traffic, in-
cluding DNS requests, through the Tor SOCKS proxy, provides a Windows-Firefox
user agent regardless of the native platform, and includes many sanitization, security,
and privacy enhancements not included in native Firefox. The browser also utilizes
the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s HTTPS Everywhere extension to re-write HTTP
web requests into HTTPS whenever possible, providing an additional encryption layer
that hides web traffic from exit routers.
• Directory servers: Tor introduced a set of trusted directory servers, called direc-
tory authorities, to collect, digitally sign, and distribute network information such as
the IP addresses and public keys of onion routers. Onion routers mirror the network
information from the directories, distributing the bandwidth load. This simplified
approach is more flexible and scales faster than the previous flooding approach, but
5relies on the trust of central directory authorities. Tor ensures that each authority is
independently maintained in multiple locations and jurisdictions, reducing the like-
lihood of an attacker compromising all of them [6]. We describe the contents and
format of this network information in section 1.2.2.
• Dynamic rendezvous with hidden services: In previous onion routers, circuits
mated at a fixed common node and did not use perfect forward secrecy. Tor introduced
a distributed hashtable to record the location of the introduction node for a given
hidden service. Following the initial handshake, the server and the client then meet at
a different onion router chosen by the client. This approach significantly increased the
reliability of hidden services and distributed the communication load across multiple
rendezvous points [7]. We provide additional details on the hidden service protocol in
section 1.2.3 and our motivation for addition infrastructure in section 1.3.
As of March 2015, Tor has 2.3 million daily users that together generate 65 Gbit/s of
traffic. Tor’s network consists of nine directory authorities and 6,600 onion routers in 83
countries [1]. In a 2012 Top Secret U.S. National Security Agency presentation leaked by
Edward Snowden, Tor was recognized as the ”the king of high secure, low latency Internet
anonymity” [12] [13]. In 2014, BusinessWeek claimed that Tor was “perhaps the most
effective means of defeating the online surveillance efforts of intelligence agencies around
the world.” [14]
1.2.1 Design
Tor’s design focuses on being easily deployable, flexible, and well-understood. Tor also
places emphasis on usability in order to attract more users; more user activity translates
to an increased difficulty of isolating and breaking the privacy of any single individual. Tor
however does not manipulate any application-level protocols nor does it make any attempt
to defend against global attackers. Instead, its threat model assumes that the capabilities
of adversaries are limited to observing fractions of Tor traffic, that they can actively delay,
delete, or manipulate traffic, that they may attempt to digitally fingerprint packets, that
6they may run onion routers themselves, and that they may compromise a fraction of other
existing routers. Together, most of the assumptions may be broadly classified as traffic
analysis attacks. Tor’s final focus is defending against these types of attacks [7].
Alice
Bob
Alice
Bob
Figure 1.2: Alice communicates privately to Bob through a Tor circuit. Her communication
path consists of three routers, an entry, middle, and exit. Although Bob’s identity and
location is known to Alice, the Tor circuit prevents Bob from knowing Alice’s identity or
location. At a later time, Alice may construct a different circuit to Bob, giving her a
new identity from Bob’s perspective. Each encrypted Tor link is shown in green, the final
connection from the exit to Bob, shown in orange, is optionally encrypted.
1.2.2 Consensus Documents
Early mixnets and onion routers either assumed a static network topology or flooded
updates across the network. By contrast, Tor’s network is maintained by a small set of semi-
trusted directory authorities. Periodically, Tor routers upload digitally signed “descriptors”
to these authorities. A descriptor may contain essential routing numbers, router capabilities,
cryptographic keys, bandwidth history, or other information.
Each directory authority maintains an long-term authority key (distinct from its normal
identity key if it is a Tor router) and a medium-term signing key. Periodically, each directory
authority
1. Aggregates the descriptors into a single “status vote” document.
2. Signs its vote with its signing key.
73. Exchanges its vote and signature with all other authorities.
4. Computes a single network status consensus from all the other voting documents.
5. Signs the network consensus and exchanges the signature with all other authorities.
Once this is complete, the consensus is published and is available for download. If
clients have knowledge of the Tor network, they may download the more recent consensus
from the directory-mirroring routers. By this system, new routers or changes to existing
routers can be propagated to all parties within a very short timeframe. Although routers
can optionally publish additional non-essential descriptors, clients and routers typically only
need the essential descriptors containing routing information, directory signing keys, and
router keys. We discuss the documents containing these descriptors below [15] [16]:
cached-certs
The cached-certs document contains the long-term authority identity keys and the
medium-term signing keys from each directory authority. The Tor source includes the long-
term keys, so all parties can verify the authenticity of the signing keys and in turn the
descriptors signed by them. They will believe router descriptors if more than half of the
authorities have signed it. Each certificate contains the following fields:
• fingerprint: The SHA-1 hash of the identity key.
• dir-key-published: The time in UTC when the keys were last published.
• dir-key-expires: The time in UTC when the signing keys expire.
• dir-identity-key: The identity key, typically a 3072-bit RSA key.
• dir-signing-key: The signing key, typically a 2048-bit RSA key.
• dir-key-crosscert: The signature of the identity key, made using the signing key.
• dir-key-certification: The signature from the identity key of the above fields.
8cached-microdesc-consensus
The cached-microdesc-consensus document contains network status information. The
document includes a header and then a list of condensed descriptors from each router, called
microdescriptors. The header includes the following fields:
• valid-after (VA), fresh-until (FU), and valid-until (VU). Three timestamps in
UTC, VA < FU < VU. VA and VU specifies the earliest and latest time that
these descriptors are valid, respectively. All three values are chosen such that two
consensuses overlap: consensusx will be considered fresh until consensusx+1 becomes
valid, and then consensusx expires when consensusx+1 is no longer fresh.
• client-versions and server-versions: An ascending list of recommended Tor ver-
sions for clients and routers, respectively.
• A list of directory authorities, each containing:
– dir-source: The authority’s nickname, fingerprint, IP address, onion routing
port, and directory port.
– contact: Optional contact information for the authority operator.
– vote-digest: The hash of the authority’s status vote document.
Following the header, each microdescriptor contains:
• r: The router’s nickname, fingerprint, time of last restart, IP address, onion routing
port, and directory port.
• m: The SHA-256 hash of the router’s microdescriptor. This also includes its entries
in the cached-microdescs document (discussed below).
• s: A list of the router’s status flags, as given by the directory authorities. Common
examples include Running, Valid, Fast, Guard, Stable, and Exit.
• v: The version of the Tor software that the router is running.
9• w: The estimated bandwidth that this router is capable of. This value is deter-
mined by speed tests from bandwidth authorities, who are a subset of the directory
authorities.
cached-microdescs
The cached-microdescs document contains cryptographic keys from each Tor router.
Each entry contains:
• onion-key: The router’s public RSA key.
• ntor-onion-key: The router’s public Curve25519 key.
• family: The fingerprint of routers also under the operator’s administration; Tor
clients will not construct circuits through any routers that have the same family or
that are in the same /16 IPv4 block.
• id: The router’s fingerprint.
1.2.3 Hidden Services
Although Tor’s primary and most popular use is for privacy-enhanced access to the
traditional Internet, Tor also supports hidden services – anonymous servers hosting services
such as websites, marketplaces, or chatrooms. These servers intentionally mask their IP
addresses through Tor circuits and thus cannot normally be accessed outside the context
of Tor. In contrast to Tor-anonymized web requests where the client is anonymous but the
server is known, Tor hidden services provide bidirectional anonymity where both parties
remain anonymous and never directly communicate with one another [17].
Hidden services are known by their special domain name, which uses the .onion top-level
domain (TLD). The Tor software considers this TLD a special case and does not attempt
to resolve it on the Internet DNS, but rather through the Tor network. Hidden service
addresses are algorithmically generated from the server’s public RSA key; the address is
the first 16 bytes of the base32-encoded SHA-1 hash of the server’s RSA key. This builds
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a publicly-confirmable one-to-one relationship between the public key and its address and
allows hidden services to be referenced by their address in a distributed environment.
Let Bob be a hidden service. At startup, Bob randomly selects several router and builds
Tor circuits to them. He then creates a hidden service descriptor, consisting of his public key
BK and a list of these routers. He signs the descriptor and sends a distributed hashtable
within the Tor network, enabling the routers he chose to act as his introduction points.
When Alice, a Tor client, obtains Bob’s hidden service address though a backchannel, she
queries this hashtable for Bob’s address. Once she obtains Bob’s hidden service descriptor,
she then builds a circuit to one of the introduction points. Simultaneously, Alice also selects
and builds a circuit to another relay, RA. She encrypts RA and a nonce with BK and gives
the result to RA. Bob decrypts the message and builds a circuit to RA (for security reasons,
he uses the same guard router [10] [11]) and sends the nonce to Alice. Alice can then
confirm Bob’s authenticity and the two can begin communication over six Tor nodes: three
established by Alice and three by Bob.
Figure 1.3: The number of unique .onion
addresses seen in Tor’s distributed hashtable
between January through April 2015 [1] [2].
Figure 1.4: The amount of traffic generated
by hidden services between January through
April 2015 [1] [2].
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1.3 Motivation
As hidden service addresses are algorithmically generated from the service’s RSA key,
there is a strong discontinuity between the address and the service’s purpose. For exam-
ple, a visitor cannot determine that 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion is the DuckDuckGo search
engine without visiting the hidden service. Generally speaking, it is currently impossible
to categorize or fully label hidden services in advance. Over time, third-party directories
– both on the Clearnet and Darknet – have appeared in attempt to counteract this issue,
but these directories must be constantly maintained and the approach is neither convenient
nor does it scale well. Given the approximetly 25,000 hidden services on the Tor network,
there is a strong need for a more complete solution to solve the usability issue.
1.4 Contributions
Our contribution to this problem is five-fold:
• We enable hidden service operators to construct a strong association between a unique
human-meaningful domain name and their hidden service address.
• We described a distributed DNS database that is tamper-proof, self-healing, resistant
to node compromise, and provides authenticated denial-of-existence.
• We provide OnioNS as a plugin for the existing Tor network, rather than introduce a
new network. This simplifies our assumptions and largely reduces our threat model
to attack vectors already well-understood on the Tor network.
• We enable Tor clients to verify the authenticity of a domain name against its corre-
sponding hidden service address with minimal data transfers in a single query.
• We preserve the anonymity of both the hidden service and the privacy of Tor clients
connecting to it.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first alternative DNS for Tor hidden services
which is distributed, secure, and usable at the same time.
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CHAPTER 2
PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1 Assumptions and Threat Model
OnioNS’ basic design and protocols rely on several assumptions and expected threat
vectors.
1. We assume that Tor provides privacy and anonymity; if Alice constructs a three-hop
Tor circuit to Bob with modern Tor circuit construction protocols and sends a message
m to Bob, we assume that Bob can learn no more about Alice than the contents of m.
This implies that if m does not contain identifiable information, Alice is anonymous
from Bob’s perspective, regardless of if m is exposed to an attacker, Eve. Identifiable
information in m is outside of Tor’s scope, but we do not introduce any protocols that
cause this scenario.
2. We assume secure cryptographic primitives; namely that Eve cannot break standard
cryptographic primitives such as AES, SHA-2, RSA, Curve25519, Ed25519, and the
scrypt key derivation function. We assume that Eve maintains no backdoors or knows
secret software breaks in the Botan or the OpenSSL implementations of these primi-
tives.
3. We assume that not all Tor routers are honest; that Eve controls some percentage of
Tor routers such that Eve’s routers may actively collude. Routers may also be semi-
honest; wiretapped but not capable of violating protocols. However, the percentage of
dishonest and semi-honest routers is small enough to avoid violating our first assump-
tion. We assume a fixed percentage of dishonest and semi-honest routers; namely that
the percentage of routers under an Eve’s control does not increase in response to the
inclusion of OnionNS into Tor infrastructure. This assumption simplifies our threat
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model analysis but we consider it realistic because while Tor traffic is purposely secret
as it travels through the network, we consider OnioNS information public so we don’t
consider the inclusion of OnioNS a motivating factor to Eve.
4. If C is a Tor network status consensus, Q is an M -sized set randomly but determin-
istically selected from the Fast and Stable routers listed in C, and Q is under the
influence of one or more adversaries, we assume that the largest subset of agreeing
routers in Q are at least semi-honest.
2.2 Design Objectives
Here we enumerate a list of requirements that must be met by any DNS applicable to
Tor hidden services. In Chapter 4 we analyse several existing prominent naming systems
and show how these systems do not meet these requirements. In Chapters 5 and 6 we
demonstrate how we overcome them with OnioNS.
1. The system must support anonymous registrations. The system should not
require any personally-identifiable or location information from the registrant.
2. The system must support privacy-enhanced queries. Clients should be anony-
mous, indistinguishable, and unable to be tracked by name servers.
3. Registrations must be authenticable. Clients must be able to verify that the
domain-address pairing that they receive from name servers is authentic relative to
the authenticity of the hidden service.
4. Domain names must be globally unique. Any domain name of global scope
must point to at most one server. For naming systems that generate names via
cryptographic hashes, the key-space must be of sufficient length to resist cryptanalytic
attack.
5. The system must be distributed. Systems with root authorities have distinct
disadvantages compared to distributed networks: specifically, central authorities have
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absolute control over the system and root security breaches could easily compromise
the integrity of the entire system. Root authorities may also be able to compromise the
privacy of both users and hidden services or may not allow anonymous registrations.
6. The system must be relatively easy to use. It should be assumed that users
are not security experts or have technical backgrounds. The system must resolve
protocols with minimal input from the user and hide non-essential details.
7. The system must be backwards compatible. Naming systems for Tor must
preserve the original Tor hidden service protocol, making the DNS optional but not
required.
8. The system should be lightweight. In most realistic environments clients have
neither the bandwidth nor storage capacity to hold the system’s entire database, nor
the capability of meeting significant computation burdens.
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CHAPTER 3
CHALLENGES
3.1 Zooko’s Triangle
Our primary objective with OnioNS is to provide human-meaningful domain names
Tor hidden services, but we list distributed and securely unique domain names in our de-
sign requirements. Achieving all three objectives is not easy; a naming scheme can use
a central root zone or authority to ensure that meaningful domains remain unique, but
then it is not distributed; it can achieve a distributed nature by generating domain names
with cryptographic hash function, but then domains are no longer human-meaningful; or it
can allow peers to provide meaningful names to each other, but then these names are not
guaranteed to be globally unique. This problem is illustrated in Figure 3.1 and summa-
rized by Zooko’s Triangle, a conjecture proposed by Zooko Wilcox-O’Hearn in 2001. The
conjecture states a persistent naming system can achieve at most two of these properties:
it can provide unique and meaningful names but not be distributed, it can be distributed
and provide unique names that are not meaningful, or it can be distributed and provide
meaningful names that are not guaranteed to be unique [18] [19].
Figure 3.1: Zooko’s Triangle.
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Some examples of naming systems that achieve only two of these properties include:
• Securely unique and human-meaningful — Internet domain names are memo-
rable and provably collision free, but the Internet DNS with a hierarchical structure
with central authorities under the jurisdiction of ICANN.
• Decentralized and human-meaningful — Human names and nicknames are legal
and social labels for each other, but we provide no protection against name collisions.
• Securely unique and decentralized — Tor hidden service .onion addresses, PGP
keys, and Bitcoin/Namecoin addresses use the large key-space and the collision-free
properties of cryptographic hash algorithms to ensure uniqueness, but do not use
meaningful names.
3.2 Non-existence Verification
In our design requirements we specify that clients of a naming system should be able
to verify the authenticity of domain names. On the Internet, the former is addressed by
SSL certificates and a chain of trust to root Certificate Authorities, while the latter remains
a possible attack vector. Of equal importance, however, is the capability to verify a claim
of non-existence by a name server. This is a weakness often overlooked in other DNSs
and resolving this problem is not easy. While DNSSEC does provide an extension for this
purpose, DNSSEC has not seen widespread use and to our knowledge no alternative DNS
provides mechanisms for authenticated denial-of-existence.
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CHAPTER 4
EXISTING WORKS
We now examine several workarounds and existing naming systems against the design
objectives listed in Section 2.2.
4.1 Address Manipulation
Although they are not separate naming systems in their own right, several systems
have been proposed to directly improve the readability of hidden service addresses. These
include vanity key generators and different encoding schemes.
Shallot is a vanity key generator which generates by brute-force many RSA keys in
attempt to find one that has a desirable hash [20]. For example, a hidden service operator
may wish to start his service’s address with a meaningful noun so that others may more
easily recognize it. Shallot has been used successfully for both common and high-profile
hidden services, such as blockchainbdgpzk.onion, an official mirror of Blockchain.info; face-
bookcorewwwi.onion, Facebook’s hidden service; and freepress3xxs3hk.onion, the Freedom
of the Press’s SecureDrop instance. However, Shallot is only partially successful at enhanc-
ing readability because the size of the domain key-space is too large to be fully brute-forced
in any reasonable length of time [20]. This situation is expected to get worse over time as
Tor plans to increase the length of hidden service addresses [21]. If the address key-space
was reduced to allow a full brute-force, the system would fail to be collision-free.
Nicolussi suggested changing the address encoding from base32 to a delimited series
of words, using a dictionary known in advance by all parties [17]. Like Shallot, Nicolussi’s
encoding is cosmetic and only partially improves the recognition and readability of an
address but does nothing to alleviate the logistic problems of manually entering in the
address into the Tor Browser.
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4.2 Centralized or Zone-Based DNS
4.2.1 Internet DNS
The Internet DNS is another one candidate and is already well established as a fun-
damental abstraction layer for Internet routing. Despite its widespread use and extreme
popularity, the Internet DNS suffers from several significant shortcomings and security issues
that make it inappropriate for use by Tor hidden services. With the exception of extensions
such as DNSSEC, the Internet DNS by default does not use any cryptographic primitives.
DNSSEC is primarily designed to prevent forgeries and DNS cache poisoning from inter-
mediary name servers and it does not provide any degree of query privacy [22]. Additional
extensions and protocols such as DNSCurve [23] have been proposed, but DNSSEC and
DNSCurve are optional and have not yet seen widespread full deployment across the In-
ternet. Traditional DNS lookups may be intercepted and modified by MITM attacks, user
privacy may be compromised by wiretapping DNS lookups, and the system is by default
vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning.
The lack of default security in Internet DNS and the financial expenses involved with
registering a new TLD casts significant doubt on the feasibility of using it for Tor hidden
services. Furthermore the system meets only a few of our design requirements: although the
system is easy to use, the system is hierarchical but not truly distributed, domain registrars
typically require the owner to reveal significant amounts of identifiable information, regis-
trations are not confirmable except through expensive SSL certificates issues by a central
authority, and lookups occur by default without any privacy enhancements. These issues
make the Internet DNS ill-suited for Tor hidden services.
4.2.2 GNU Name System
The GNU Name System [22] (GNS) is a zone-based alternative DNS. GNS describes
a hierarchical zones of names (using the .gns pseudo-TLD) with each user managing their
own zone and distributing zone access peer-to-peer within social circles. While GNS’ design
guarantees the uniqueness of names within each zone and users are capable of selecting
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meaningful nicknames for themselves, GNU does not guarantee that names are globally
unique. Furthermore, the selection of a trustworthy zone to use would be a significant
challenge for using GNS for Tor hidden services and such a selection no longer makes the
system distributed. However, GNS does meet many, but not all, of our requirements, so we
consider GNS a very impressive system and recommend GNS as a possible fallback from
OnioNS.
4.2.3 Namecoin
Namecoin is an early fork of Bitcoin [24] and is noteworthy for achieving all three
properties of Zooko’s Triangle. Namecoin holds digitally-signed information transactions in
a data structure known as a block; each block links to a previous block, forming a public
ledger known as a blockchain. Storing textual information such as a domain registration
consumes some Namecoins, a unit of currency. In 2014, Namecoin was recognized by ICANN
as the most well-known example of a PKI and DNS system with an emphasis of distributed
control and privacy.
While Namecoin is often advertised as capable of assigning names to Tor hidden ser-
vices, it has several practical issues that make it generally infeasible to be used for that
purpose. First, to authenticate registrations, clients must be able to prove the relation-
ship between a Namecoin owner’s secp256k1 ECDSA key and the target hidden service’s
RSA key, and constructing this relationship is non-trivial. Second, Namecoin is typically
a heavyweight DNS: it generally requires users to pre-fetch and then verify the blockchain,
which is 2.45 GB as of April 2015 [25]. Third, although Namecoin supports anonymous
ownership of information, it is non-trivial to anonymously purchase Namecoins, thus pre-
venting domain registration from being truly anonymous. These issues prevent Namecoin
from being a practical alternative DNS for Tor hidden service. However, our work shares
some design principles with Namecoin.
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CHAPTER 5
SOLUTION
5.1 Overview
We propose the Onion Name System (OnioNS) as an abstraction layer to hidden ser-
vice addresses and introduce “.tor” as a new pseudo-TLD for this purpose. The system
has three main aspects: the generation of self-signed claims on domain names by hidden
service operators, the processing of domain information within the OnioNS servers, and the
receiving and authentication of domain names by a Tor client.
First, a hidden service operator, Bob, generates an association between a meaningful
second-level domain name and his .onion address. Without loss of generality, let this be
“example.tor → onions55e7yam27n.onion”. We introduce a proof-of-work scheme that re-
quires Bob to expend computational and memory resources to claim “example.tor”, a more
privacy-enhanced alternative to financial compensation to a central authority. Proof-of-
work systems are noteworthy for their asymmetry: they require the issuer to spend effort
to find an answer to a moderately hard computational problem, but once solved can be
easily verified correct by any recipient. The requirement of proof-of-work fulfils three main
purposes:
1. Significantly reduces the threat of DoS flood attack.
2. Introduces a barrier-of-entry that encourages the utilization of domain names and the
availability of the underlying hidden services.
3. Increases the difficulty of domain squatting, a denial-of-service attack where a third-
party claims one or more valuable domain names for the purpose of denying or selling
them en masse to others.
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Second, Bob uses a Tor circuit to anonymously transmit his Record to an authoritative
short-lived random subset of OnioNS servers, known as the Quorum, inside the Tor network.
The Quorum archive Bob’s Record in a sequential public ledger known as a Pagechain, of
which each OnioNS node holds their own local copy. Bob’s Record is received by all Quorum
nodes and share signatures of their knowledge with each other, so they maintain a common
database.
Third, Alice, uses a Tor client to anonymously connect to a name server outside the
Quorum but mirroring their database, then ask for “example.tor”. Alice receives Bob’s
Record, verifies it signature and proof-of-work, and follows the association to
“onions55e7yam27n.onion”. As Bob’s Record is self-signed using Bob’s private key, Alice
can verify the Record’s authenticity. Finally, Alice uses this address and the Tor hidden
service protocol to contact Bob. In this way, Alice can contact Bob through his chosen
domain name without resorting to use lower-level hidden service addresses. The uniqueness
and authenticity of the Bob’s domain name is maintained by the subset of Tor nodes.
5.2 Definitions
To discuss OnioNS precisely we must first define some central terms that we will use
throughout the rest of this document. We detail their exact contents in section 5.5 and how
they are used throughout sections 5.3 and 5.6.
domain name is a case-insensitive identification string claimed by a hidden service
operator. The syntax of OnioNS domain names mirrors the Internet DNS; we use a sequence
of name-delimiter pairs with a .tor pseudo top-level domain (TLD) that is not used on the
Internet DNS. The TLD is a name at depth one and is preceded by names at sequentially
increasing depth. The term “domain name” refers to the identification string as a whole,
while “second-level domain” refers to the central name that is immediately followed by the
TLD, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Domain names point to destinations – other domain
names with either the .tor or .onion TLD.
The Internet DNS defines a hierarchy of administrative realms that are closely tied to
the depth of each name. By contrast, OnioNS makes no such distinction; we let hidden
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www.example.tor
subdomain
second level domain
top-level domain
Figure 5.1: A sample domain name: a sequence of labels separated by delimiters. In
OnioNS, hidden service operators build associations between second-level domain names
and their hidden service address.
service operators claim a second-level name and then control all names of greater depth
under that second-level name.
A Record is a small textual data structure that contains a single second-level domain
name, a mapping of subdomains to .tor or .onion pseudo-TLD destinations, proof-of-work,
a digital signature, a public key, and an optional PGP fingerprint. Records are issued by
hidden service operators and sent to OnioNS servers. Every Record is self-signed with the
hidden service’s key. In section 5.5.1 we describe the five different types of Records: Create,
Modify, Move, Renew, and Delete.
A Page is textual database designed to archive one or more Records in long-term
storage. Pages are held and digitally signed by OnioNS nodes and are writable only for
fixed periods of time before they are read-only. Each Page contains a link to a previous
Page, forming an append-only public ledger known as an Pagechain. This forms a two
dimensional distributed data structure: the chain of Pages grows over time and there are
multiple redundant copies of each Page spread out across the network at any given time.
A Mirror is any machine (inside or outside of the Tor network) that has performed a
synchronization (section 5.6.2) against the OnioNS network and now holds a complete copy
of the Pagechain. Mirrors do not actively participate in the OnioNS network and do not
have the power to manipulate the main page-chain.
A Quorum Candidates are Mirrors inside the Tor network that have also fulfilled two
additional requirements: 1) they must demonstrate that they are an up-to-date Mirror, and
2) that they have sufficient CPU and bandwidth capabilities to handle powering OnioNS
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in addition to their regular Tor duties. In other words, they are qualified and capable to
power OnioNS, but have not yet been chosen to do so.
The Quorum is a subset of Quorum Candidates who have active responsibility over
maintaining the master OnioNS Pagechain. Each Quorum node actively its own Page, which
has a lifetime of that Quorum. The Quorum is randomly chosen from Quorum Candidates
as described in section 5.6.3.
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Figure 5.2: The relationship between Mirrors, Quorum Candidates, and the Quorum. A
Mirror is any machine that holds the OnioNS Pagechain, Quorum Candidates are both
up-to-date Mirrors and reliable Tor nodes, and the Quorum is randomly selected from the
pool of Quorum Candidates.
Throughout the rest of this document, let Alice be a Tor client, and Bob be the operator
of a hidden service with access to his private HS RSA key. As both Alice and Bob are
Tor users, they can obtain and fully verify any past or current set of the three consensus
documents described in section 1.2.2.
5.3 Basic Design
5.3.1 Claim on a Domain Name
To claim a domain name for his hidden service, Bob first generates a valid Record
and transmits it over a Tor circuit to a randomly-selected Quorum node. Bob receives a
response indicating whether the Record was accepted or not and can confirm that it was
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Figure 5.3: Bob uses a Tor circuit to anonymously upload a Record to OnioNS. Alice uses
her own Tor circuit to query the system for a domain name, and she is given Bob’s Record
in response. Then Alice connects to Bob by Tor’s hidden service protocol.
re-transmitted by immediately querying another Quorum node for that Record. Mirrors
can subscribe to network events from other Mirrors in a peer-to-peer fashion, thus allowing
Records and other information to quickly propagate the network, as illustrated in Figure
5.4.
5.3.2 Pagechain Maintenance
We introduce the Pagechain, a fundamental data structure in OnioNS, in order to keep
all participating nodes in synchronization and to save Records in long-term storage. It is
a distributed append-only transactional database of a fixed maximum length and is held
locally by all Mirrors. Like a blockchain, the Pagechain is designed as a public and fully
confirmable data structure – anyone can confirm the integrity, uniqueness, and validity of
all data structures contained within. The head of the chain (the latest Page) is maintained
by members of the current Quorum. Assuming that the entire Quorum is honest and
maintains perfect communication, all Quorum nodes would be maintaining an identical
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Figure 5.4: Bob uses his existing circuit (green) to inform Quorum node Q4 of the new
Record. Q4 then sends his Record to all other Quorum nodes. Each node stores it in their
own Page for long-term storage. Bob confirms from another Quorum node Q5 that his
Record has been received.
Page. However, due to malicious modifications or missed communication, disagreements
may inevitably form within the Quorum. To avoid these disagreements from misleading the
network, we let the network follow the Page maintained by the largest number of Quorum
nodes, thus allowing the structure to be partially self-healing as illustrated in Figure 5.5.
5.3.3 Client Request
Typically, Alice will look up a domain name, performing a domain query. These are
relatively straightforward. Let us assume that Bob, who owns “onions55e7yam27n.onion,”
has uploaded a Record containing “example.tor” and that another party Dave has a Record
which claims “example2.tor” and that contains “sub.example2.tor”→ “example.tor.” Then
Alice can query for “sub.example2.tor.”
Alice’s client-side software recognizes the .tor pseudo-TLD and distinguishes requests
containing it from normal Internet lookups. Her software directs the request through a Tor
circuit to some Mirror, Or. For security and load reasons, Quorum nodes refuse to respond
to queries, so Alice cannot ask them. Or finds “sub.example2.tor” and returns Dave’s
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Figure 5.5: An example Pagechain across four Quorums with three side-chains. Quorum1 is
honest and maintains reliable flooding communication, and thus has identical Pages. Here,
red nodes are colluding maliciously, orange missed some communication, and green nodes
are acting honestly. Despite the disagreements, across all four days the largest clusters are
honest nodes and thus integrity remains in the master Pagechain.
Record. Alice sees the “sub.example2.tor→ example.tor” association and now queries Or for
“example.tor” since that domain is not in Dave’s Record. Or returns Bob’s Record and Alice
sees that “example.tor” is claimed by Bob and can connect to “onions55e7yam27n.onion”
via the Tor hidden service protocol. She can send her original request of “sub.example2.tor”
to Bob, allowing Bob’s web server to provide specific content based on that hostname.
In this way, Alice can query a name server and load a hidden service by a meaningful
name. We suggest optimizations and security enhancements to this protocol in Section 5.7.
5.4 Primitives
5.4.1 Cryptographic
OnionNS makes use of cryptographic hash algorithms, digital signatures, proof-of-work,
and a pseudorandom number generator. We require that Tor routers generate an Ed25519
[26] keypair and distribute the public key via the consensus document. We note that while
we can theoretically use existing NTor keys for digital signatures as it is possible to convert
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Curve25519 to Ed25519 in constant time, we refrain from this because it is likely not a
cryptographically secure operation. Therefore we require Tor to introduce Ed25519 keys to
all Tor routers. If this is infeasible, Ed25519 can be substituted with RSA in all instances.
• Let H(x) be a cryptographic hash function. In our reference implementation we define
H(x) as SHA-384.
• Let SRSA(m, r) be a deterministic RSA digital signature function that accepts a mes-
sage m and a private RSA key r and returns an RSA digital signature. Let SRSA(m, r)
use H(x) as a digest function on m in all use cases. In our reference implementation
we define SRSA(m, r) as EMSA PKCS1 1.5.
• Let VRSA(m,E) validate an RSA digital signature by accepting a message m and a
public key R, and return true if and only if the signature is valid.
• Let Sed (m, e) be an Ed25519 digital signature function that accepts a message m and
a private key e and returns a 64-byte digital signature. Let Sed (m, e) use H(x) as a
digest function on m in all use cases.
• Let Ved (m,E) validate an Ed25519 digital signature by accepting a message m and a
public key E, and return true if and only if the signature is valid.
• Let PoW(i) be a one-way collision-free function that accepts an input key k and
returns a deterministic output. Our reference implementation uses a fixed salt and
scrypt, a password-based key derivation function which is notable for its large memory
and CPU requirements during its operation. The scrypt function provides significantly
greater resistance to custom hardware attacks and massively parallel computation
primarily due to its memory requirements. This limits attackers to the same software
implementation and asymptotic cost as legitimate users [27] [28]. We choose scrypt
because of these advantages over other key derivation functions such as SHA-256 or
PBKDF2. For these reasons scrypt is also common for proof-of-work purposes in some
cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin.
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• Let R(s) be a pseudorandom number generator that accepts an initial seed s and
returns a list of numerical pseudorandom numbers. We suggest MT19937, commonly
known as the Mersenne Twister, which is widely used throughout most programming
languages and is well known for its speed, long period, and the high quality of its
pseudorandom output [29].
5.4.2 Symbols
• Let LQ represent size of the Quorum.
• Let LT represent the number of routers in the Tor network.
• Let LP represent the maximum number of Pages in the Pagechain.
• Let q be an Quorum iteration counter.
• Let ∆q be the lifetime of a Quorum in days: every ∆q days q is incremented by one
and a new Quorum is chosen.
All textual databases are encoded in JSON. JSON is significantly more compact than
XML, but retains readability. Its support of basic primitive types is highly applicable to
our needs. Additionally, we consider the JSON format safer than byte-level encoding.
5.5 Data Structures
5.5.1 Record
There are five different types of Records: Create, Modify, Move, Renew, and Delete.
The latter four Records mimic the format of the Create Record with minor exceptions. In
each case, type is set to the Record type.
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Create
A Create Record consists of nine components. Fields that are optional are blank unless
specified, and all fields are encoded in base64, except for nameList and timestamp, which
are encoded in standard UTF-8.
Field Required? Description
type Yes A textual label containing the type of Record. In this
case, type is set to “Create”.
name Yes The second-level domain name for this hidden service.
nameList Yes An array list of zero or more .tor subdomains and their
destinations. Destinations use either .tor or .onion TLDs.
contact No Bob’s PGP key fingerprint if he has one. Client can use
this to contact Bob over encrypted email.
consensusHash Yes The hash of the consensus document that generated
Quorumq
nonce Yes Four random bytes.
pow Yes 16 bytes that store the output of PoW(i).
recordSig Yes The output of SRSA(m, r) where m = nameList ‖
timestamp ‖ consensusHash ‖ nonce ‖ pow and r is the
hidden service’s private RSA key.
pubHSKey Yes Bob’s public RSA key.
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Modify
A Modify Record allows an owner to update his registration with updated information.
The owner corrects the fields, updates consensusHash, revalidates the proof-of-work, and
transmits the record. Modify Records have a difficulty of difficultyCreate4 . Modify Records also
act as Renew Records.
Move
A Move Record is used to transfer ownership of the second-level domain name and all
associated subdomains from one hidden service key to another. Move Records must not
contain modifications and must contain one additional field: destPubKey, the public key of
the new owner. In this way, transfers are similar to Namecoin. Move records also have a
difficulty of difficultyCreate4 .
Renew
Second-level domain names (and all associated subdomains) expire every LP∆q days
because the Pagechain has a maximum length of LP Pages. Renew Records must be reis-
sued periodically at least every LP∆q days to ensure continued ownership of the domains
contained within them. No modifications to existing domain names can be made in Re-
new records, and the domain names contained within must already exist in the Pagechain.
Similar to the Modify and Move records, Renew records have a difficulty of difficultyCreate4 .
Delete
A Delete Record is used to relinquish ownership rights over a second-level domain
name. This is useful if the operator feels that his private key has been compromised or if
he has no further user for his domain. This issuance of this Record immediately triggers
a purging of the domain name in the system, making it almost immediately available for
others. There is no difficulty associated with Delete records, so they can be issued instantly.
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5.5.2 Page
Each page contains five fields.
prevHash H(prevHash ‖ recordList ‖ consensusDocHash) of a previous page.
recordList An array list of Records, sorted in a deterministic manner.
consensusDocHash H(cd).
fingerprint The Tor fingerprint of the relay maintaining this Page.
pageSig The output of Sed (H(prevHash ‖ recordList ‖ consensusDocHash)], e) where e
is the router’s private Ed25519 key.
5.6 Protocols
In section 1.2.2 we described the three consensus documents that Tor routers and
clients have: cached-certs, cached-microdesc-consensus, and cached-microdescs. Throughout
this section, let “consensus documents at time X and day Y ” specifically refer to these
three documents when valid-after is set to X and Y . For protocols that specify a hashing
of the consensus documents, let the hash only cover cached-certs and cached-microdesc-
consensus; although a router’s descriptor is split between cached-microdesc-consensus and
cached-microdescs, the microdescriptors in cached-microdesc-consensus include the SHA-
256 hash of the entire descriptor. All parties can obtain these consensus documents from
any sources because cached-certs contains the signing keys that validate cached-microdesc-
consensus. In practice, it is often efficient to compress these documents en-masse before
transmission: they achieve very high compression ratios under Lempel-Ziv-Markov chain
algorithm (LZMA).
5.6.1 Hidden Services
Record Generation
As invalid Records will be rejected by the network, Bob must generate a valid Record
before broadcast:
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1. Bob selects the value for type based on the desired operation.
2. Bob selects a second-level domain name for his hidden service and assigns it to name.
3. Bob defines subdomains and their destinations, constructing nameList.
4. Bob provides his PGP key fingerprint in contact or leaves it blank if he doesn’t have a
PGP key or if he chooses not to disclose it. Bob can derive his PGP fingerprint with
the “gpg –fingerprint” Unix command.
5. Bob sets consensusHash to the output of H(x), where x is the consensus documents
published at 00:00 GMT on day
⌊ q
∆q
⌋
.
6. Bob initially defines nonce as four zeros.
7. Let central be type ‖ nameList ‖ contact ‖ timestamp ‖ consensusHash ‖ nonce. Bob
sets pow as PoW(central).
8. Bob sets recordSig as the output of SRSA(m, r) where m = central ‖ pow and r is
Bob’s private RSA key.
9. Bob saves the PKCS.1 DER encoding of his RSA public key in pubHSKey.
Bob then must increment nonce and reset pow and recordSig until H(central ‖ pow ‖
recordSig) ≤ 2difficulty where difficulty is a fixed constant that specifies the work difficulty.
An example of a completed and valid record is shown in Figure 5.6.
Record Validation
Let Carol be a Tor client or a Mirror that receives a Record from another Mirror.
1. Carol checks that the Record contains valid JSON and that type is either “Create”,
“Modify”, “Move”, “Renew”, or “Delete”.
2. Carol checks that nameList is has a length ∈ [1, 24] and that all subdomains have a
second-level domain name of the name field. Additionally, Carol checks that there is
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0 {
1 ” type” : ”Create ” ,
2 ”name” : ”example . to r ” ,
3 ”subd” : {”sub” : ”onions55e7yam27n . onion ” } ,
4 ” contact ” : ”AD97364FC20BEC80” ,
5 ” consensusHash” : ”uU0nuZNNPgilLlLX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLvzek=” ,
6 ”nonce” : ”AAAABw==” ,
7 ”pow” : ”iOuFHz+eBoxsxDDuX/ torg==” ,
8 ” r e co rdS ig ” : ”bQCtRgJKvkG1Me1Nb0jB1cjN945vHyunFYesi7ildOrYeeZAZLWhf9
azi7YhgL+V/9edPxlGX8+8AMTmrJp6DMWeBVZegANNDzTxkc//x72w88uenQcff
JgEKZ1CyBFT3QxtIJvtsd/Te8Hwd60mnAxDR/42rD1QwhJ6PPoOCtc=” ,
9 ”pubHSKey” : ”MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDaXlifPm7dQkw0b
F7tOeEdMT9QGM2xoKRZGkNtI8+qeaqx6eiqynVPuS4DYTbr3NppqG7cykteOJlY
jBqcDPeaNIytos8q6qYyNEd3VuV6Mm46SL66BL/fIKMxmPNXLp8LfnY
UzcUxtdMetxv64Q1Nh46NX6Z8579AXVue3TuKKwIDAQAB”
10 }
Figure 5.6: A sample registration record. The textual fields are in UTF-8, while the binary
fields are in base64. The structure is encoded in JSON.
no domain name nor destination that uses more than 16 names, that is longer than
32 characters, or whose total length is more than 128 characters.
3. Carol checks that contact is either 0, 16, 24, or 32 characters in length, and that
contact is valid hexadecimal.
4. Carol checks the validity of recordSig against pubHSKey and central ‖ pow .
5. Carol obtains the
⌊ q
∆q
⌋
00:00 GMT consensus documents and checks H(x) on it
against consensusHash. She also confirms that the consensus documents are no older
than min(48, 12 ∗∆q).
6. Carol checks that H(central ‖ pow ‖ recordSig) ≤ 2difficulty
7. Carol calculates pow(central) and confirms that the output matches nonce.
If at any step an assertion fails, the Record is not valid and Carol does not accept it.
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Record Broadcast
1. Bob derives the current Quorum by the Quorum Derivation protocol.
2. Bob constructs a circuit, c1, to a Mirror node m1.
3. Bob asks for and receives from c1 the hj = H(prevHash‖recordList‖consensusDocHash)
hash and pageSig (the Ed25519 signature on that hash) from each Quorum node.
4. Bob confirms that Ved (hj , E) returns true for each hj and defines U as the largest set
of Quorum nodes that have the same hash.
5. Bob randomly chooses a node n1 from U and builds a circuit to it, c2.
6. Bob uploads his Record through c2 to n1.
7. Bob uses c1 to ask m1 for his second-level domain name.
8. Bob has confirmation that his Record was accepted and processed by the Quorum if
m1 returns the Record he uploaded.
5.6.2 OnioNS Servers
Let Charlie be the name of an OnioNS Mirror. Charlie listens for incoming Records or
signatures from one or more other Mirrors.
Database Initialization
1. Charlie creates an initial Page Pcurr and sets the PprevHash back-reference based on
the Page Selection protocol.
2. Charlie sets recordList to an empty array.
3. Charlie downloads from some remote source the consensus document cd issued on day⌊ q
∆q
⌋
at 00:00 GMT and authenticates it against the Tor authority public keys.
4. Charlie sets consensusDocHash = H(cd).
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0 {
1 ”prevHash” : 0 ,
2 ” r e c o rdL i s t ” : [ ] ,
3 ” consensusDocHash” : ”uU0nuZNNPgilLlLX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLvzek=” ,
4 ” f i n g e r p r i n t ” : ”2FC06226AE152FBAB7620BB107CDEF0E70876A7B” ,
5 ” pageSig ” : ”KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/kBEpyXRSopzjo
Fs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ELmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+QOnKl0fKBN7
fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ=”
6 }
Figure 5.7: A sample empty Page.
5. Charlie sets fingerprint to his Tor fingerprint.
6. Charlie sets pageSig = Sed (H(prevHash ‖ recordList ‖ consensusDocHash), e).
Page Selection
The Page Selection protocol relies on our security assumption that the largest set of
Quorum nodes with agreeing and valid Pages are acting honestly. In this protocol, Charlie
chooses the Page Pc maintained by that set.
1. Charlie calculates the Quorum via the Quorum Derivation protocol.
2. Charlie obtains the set of Pages maintained by Quorumq.
3. For each Page,
(a) Charlie checks that prevHash references some page from the previous Quorum.
(b) Charlie calculates h = H(prevHash ‖ recordList ‖ consensusDocHash).
(c) Charlie checks that fingerprint is a member of Quorumq.
(d) Charlie checks that Ved (h,E) returns true.
4. Charlie sorts the set of Pages by h, and constructs a 2D array of Pages that have the
same h.
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5. For each set of Pages with equal h,
(a) Charlie checks that consensusDocHash = H(cd).
(b) Charlie checks each Record in recordList via the Record Validation protocol.
6. If the validation of a Page fails, Charlie removes it from the equal-h list.
7. Let Pc be chosen arbitrarily from the largest set of valid Pages with equal h.
In this way, Charlie need not preform a deep verification of all Pages from Quorumq
in order to choose a Page.
Pagechain Validation
Assume that Charlie has obtained a complete Pagechain. Let Pc be an initial empty
Page and let f(P1, P2, q) accept two Pages and return true if P1 = P2 or if q = 0. For each
qi from the oldest available qj to the most recent qk,
1. Charlie chooses a Page Pc2 from Quorumqi via the Page Selection Protocol.
2. Charlie checks that f(Pc, Pc2, q) returns true, otherwise repeats step 1 to choose an-
other Page from the next largest set of Pages that have equal h.
3. Charlie calculates hi = H(prevHash ‖ recordList ‖consensusDocHash), fields from Pc2.
4. Charlie checks that Pc2’s prevPage field equals hi−1 or that i = j, otherwise repeats
step 1 to choose the Page from the next largest set.
Synchronization
1. Charlie randomly selects a Mirror relay, Rj .
2. Charlie downloads Rj ’s Pagechain and the Pages used by each Quorum member for
each Quorum, obtaining a 2D data structure at most LP Pages long and LQ Pages
wide.
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3. Charlie checks the downloaded Pagechain via the Pagechain Validation protocol. If it
does not validate, Charlie picks another Mirror Rk, k 6= j, and downloads the invalid
Pages from Rk.
4. Charlie randomly selects a Quorum node Qc and subscribes to Record and signature
networking events from it.
5. When a set of Pages is available from Qc, Charlie follows the Page Selection protocol
to choose a Page that becomes the new Pagechain head.
Quorum Qualification
The Quorum is the OnioNS most trusted set of authoritative nodes. They have respon-
sibility over the master Pagechain and are responsible for handling incoming Records from
hidden service operators. As such, the Quorum must be derived from the most reliable,
capable, and trusted Tor nodes and more importantly Quorum nodes must be up-to-date
Mirrors. These two requirements are crucial to ensuring the reliability and security of the
Quorum.
The first criteria requires Tor nodes to demonstrate that they sufficient capabilities to
handle the increase in communication and processing from with OnioNS protocols. Fortu-
nately, Tor’s infrastructure already provides a mechanism that can be utilized to demon-
strate this requirement; Tor authority nodes assign flags to Tor routers to classify their
capabilities, speed, or uptime history: these flags are used for circuit generation and hidden
service infrastructure. Let Tor nodes meet the first qualification requirement if they have
the Fast, Stable, Running, and Valid flags. As of February 2015, out of the ≈ 7,000 nodes
participating in the Tor network, ≈ 5,400 of these node have these flags and complete the
second requirement [1].
To demonstrate the second criteria, the na¨ıve solution is to simply ask nodes meeting
the first criteria for their Page, and then compare the recency of its latest Page against the
Pages from the other nodes. However, this solution does not scale well; Tor has ≈ 2.25
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million daily users [1]: it is infeasible for any single node to handle queries from all of them.
Instead, let each Mirror that meets the first criteria perform the following:
1. Charlie calculates t = H(pc ‖ ⌊m−1530 ⌋) where pc is Charlie’s Pagechain and m is the
number of minutes elapsed in that day. Tor’s consensus documents are published at
the top of each hour; we manipulate m such that t is consistent at the top of each
hour even with at most a 15-minute clock-skew.
2. Let Charlie convert t to base64 and truncate to 8 bytes.
3. Let Charlie include this new t in the Contact field in his relay descriptor sent to Tor
authority nodes.
We suggest placing t inside a new field within the router descriptor in future work, but
our use of the Contact field eases integration with existing Tor infrastructure. The field
is a user-defined optional entry that Tor relay operators typically use to list methods of
contact such as an email address. OnionNS would not be the first system to embed special
information in the Contact field: PGP keys and BTC addresses commonly appear in the
field, especially for high-performance routers.
Record Processing
A Quorum node Qj listens for new Records from hidden service operators. When a
Record r is received, Qj
1. Qj rejects r if the Record is not valid.
2. Qj rejects r if no such hidden service descriptor exists in Tor’s distributed hashtable.
3. Qj rejects r if Qj ’s Pagechain contains ≥ 2 Create Records containing r’s pubHSkey.
4. If r is a Create record, Qj rejects r if its second-level domain already exists in Qj ’s
Pagechain.
5. If r is a Modify, Move, Renew or Delete Record, Qj rejects r if either of the following
are true:
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(a) r’s Create Record was not found in the Pagechain.
(b) r’s pubHSKey does not match the latest Record found in the Pagechain under
its second-level domain name.
6. If Qj has rejected r, Qj informs Bob of this outcome and its reason.
7. If Qj has not rejected r, Qj informs Bob that r was accepted and Qj merges the
Record into its Page.
5.6.3 Tor Clients
Let Alice be a Tor client. We assume now that Alice has chosen Charlie as her domain
resolver and that Charlie is not a member of the current Quorum, since Quorum nodes
don’t answer queries.
Quorum Derivation
1. Alice obtains the consensus documents, cd, published on day
⌊ q
∆q
⌋
at 00:00 GMT.
2. Alice scans cd and constructs a list qc of Quorum Candidates of Tor routers that have
the Fast, Stable, Running, and Valid flags and that are in the largest set of Tor routers
that publish an identical time-based hash, as described in the Quorum Qualification
protocol. She can construct qc in O(LT ) time.
3. Alice constructs f = R(H(cd).
4. Alice uses f to randomly scramble qc.
5. The first min(size(qc), LQ) routers are the Quorum.
Domain Query
The basic design of the Domain Query is relatively straightforward.
1. Alice constructs a Tor circuit to Charlie.
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2. Alice provides a .tor domain name d into the Tor Browser, which is treated as a special
case by her client software.
3. If d’s highest-level name is “www”, Alice’s software transparently removes that name.
4. Alice asks Charlie for the most recent Record r containing d.
5. Charlie reviews his Pagechain reverse-chronological order until he finds a Record con-
taining d, which he returns to Alice.
6. Alice validates r via the Record Validation protocol. If it does not validate, Alice
throws an assertion error.
7. If the destination for d in r uses a .tor TLD, d becomes that destination and Alice
jumps back to step 3.
8. Otherwise, the destination must have a .onion TLD, which Alice looks up by the Tor
hidden service protocol.
9. Alice checks that r’s pubHSKey matches r’s key in Tor’s distributed hash table.
10. Alice sends the original d to the hidden service.
We supplement this protocol with an additional data structure in section 5.7.3 as a
defense against Record forgeries. It is also possible for Alice to request and the Page p
containing r and all digital signatures from each Quorum node, allowing Alice to perform
width verification as she can see that a large percentage of Quorum nodes maintained p.
Of course, Alice can be certain that the Record r she receives is authentic and that d is
unique by performing a full Synchronization and obtaining Charlie’s Pagechain for herself,
but this is impractical in most environments. It cannot be safely assumed that Alice has
storage capacity to hold all the Pages in the Pagechain. Additionally, Tor’s median circuit
speed is often less than 1 MiBs [1], so for convenience data transfer must be minimized.
Therefore Alice can simply fetch minimal information and rely on her trust of Charlie and
the Quorum.
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Onion Query
Alice may also issue a reverse-hostname lookup to Charlie to find second-level domains
that resolve to a given .onion address. This request is known as an Onion Query. Charlie
performs a reverse-chronological search in the Pagechain for Records whose pubHSKey hash
to Alice’s address. We note that all OnioNS domain names will have Forward-Confirmed
Reverse DNS match.
5.7 Optimizations
There are several improvements that be made upon the basic design protocols that
significantly enhance the performance of Mirrors when responding to Domain or Onion
Requests. We also introduce a Merkle Tree to prevent Mirrors from forging Records or
falsely claiming non-existence, thus preventing them from being actively malicious in all
significant cases.
5.7.1 AVL Tree
An AVL tree is a self-balancing binary search tree with O(log(n)) time for search,
insertion, and deletion operations. We suggest that OnioNS mirrors cache all the Records
in its local Pagechain in an AVL tree. After the Pagechain is validated, the Mirror iterates
through the Pagechain in chronological order and builds an AVL tree. The leaves of the
tree are the location of each Record in the Pagechain, while the keys are the Record’s name
field. The Mirror should then update the AVL tree when it receives new Records that were
recently sent to Quorum nodes. Create Records trigger an insert operation, Delete Records
cause a deletion, and all other Records update a location pointer to the more recent Record.
This approach effectively transforms the lookup time of Records for Domain Queries from
O(n) to O(log(n)) in the average and worst cases.
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5.7.2 Trie
We also suggest utilizing a trie (a digital tree) for efficiently structuring .onion addresses
and optimizing Onion Query lookups. If each node in the trie is a character in the .onion
address, the trie has a branching factor of 32 and a maximum depth of 16. Let the leaves
of the trie be the location of the most recent Record in the Pagechain that has that address
as a destination. Like the AVL tree, Mirrors must take care to update the trie cache when
processing new Records, but this is efficient as trie search, insertion, and deletion all occur
in O(1).
5.7.3 Merkle Tree
A Merkle tree is a hash tree, a special type of binary tree wherein each non-leaf node
is the hash of node’s children. We introduce the Merkle tree for two purposes: 1) to
prove the non-existence of a domain name, and 2) to prove the authenticity of an existing
domain name. This first property is a challenge often overlooked in other domain name
systems: even if domain names can be authenticated by a client (e.g. OnioNS Records or
SSL certificates) a DNS resolver may lie about the non-existence and claim a false negative.
In OnioNS, Alice can download the entire Pagechain and confirm for herself, but as we
stated earlier this is not practical. Alice could also query another trusted source such as
Quorum Candidates, but this approach does not scale well. Instead, a trusted authority
(the Quorum) can sign the Merkle tree once.
Merkle trees also allow anyone to verify that a leaf node is part of a given hash tree in
O(log(n)) and without requiring knowledge of the entire tree. We utilize these two properties
to allow clients to authenticate Records with minimal networking costs in a single query
to an untrusted Mirror name server. To our knowledge this represents the first alternative
DNS to authenticate denial-of-existence claims on domains en-masse. To achieve this, let
each Quorum node
1. Construct an array list arr.
2. For each Record r in the Pagechain, add rname ‖H(r) to arr.
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3. Sort arr.
4. Construct a Merkle tree T from arr.
5. Generate sigT = Sed (t ‖ r, e) where t is a timestamp and r is the root hash of T .
As Records contains all subdomains under a single second-level domains, T needs only
contain rname to reference all domains in r, which further saves space. Then during a
Domain Query Alice may use T to authenticate a domain d and verify non-existence for a
Record r.
1. Alice extracts the second-level name c from d.
2. If r exists, Charlie returns the leaf node containing r and all the tree nodes from leaf
r to the root and their sibling nodes, so that Alice can verify authenticity of r by
recomputing the root hash and verify that the largest subset of Quorum nodes signed
the same root hash.
3. If Charlie claims non-existence of c, he returns two adjacent leaves a and b (and the
nodes on their paths and siblings) such that a < c < b, or in the boundary cases that
a is undefined and b is the left-most leaf or b is undefined and a is the right-most leaf.
4. If either assertion fails, Charlie is dishonest.
The Quorum must regenerate T every ∆T hours to include new Records. Then Al-
ice needs only fetch the signatures on T at least every ∆T hours to ensure that she can
authenticate new Records during the Domain Query. Although new Records can traverse
the network nearly instantaneously, Alice cannot authenticate or verify denial-of-existence
claims on Records newer than ∆T . Alice must also fetch the LQ signature from all Quorum
nodes and assert that T is signed by the largest set of nodes maintaining the same Page so
as to agree with our last security assumption.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS
6.1 Security
Now we examine and compare OnioNS’ central protocols against our security assump-
tions and expected threat model.
6.1.1 Quorum Selection
The Quorum nodes have greater attack capabilities than any other class of participants
in OnioNS. In our threat model, we assume that an attacker, Eve, already has control of
some fixed number fE of routers in the Tor network, and that her nodes may maliciously
collude. It is also impossible to determine which Tor routers are under Eve’s control and
which are honest in advance, so we examine our Quorum protocols and explore the likelihood
of attacks within a probabilistic environment.
The Quorum Derivation protocol selects an LQ-sized subset of routers from the set of
Quorum Candidates, and rotates this selection every ∆q days. The optimal selection of
LQ and ∆q is dependent on both security and performance analysis; our security analysis
introduces a lower bound on both LQ and ∆q. For the following evaluations, we feel it safe to
discard threats that have probabilities at or below 1
2128
≈ 10−38.532 — the probability of Eve
randomly guessing a 128-bit AES key, a threat that would violate our security assumption
on the security of Tor circuits.
We assume that LQ will be selected from a pool of 5,400 Quorum Candidates — the
number, as of April 2015, of Tor routers with the Fast and Stable flags, whom we assume
are all up-to-date Mirrors. Let LE be the number of Quorum nodes under Eve’s control.
Then Eve controls the Quorum if the LE routers become the largest agreeing subset in the
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Quorum, which can occur if either more than
LQ−LE
2 honest Quorum nodes disagree or if
LE >
LQ
2 . The second scenario can be statistically modelled.
Quorum selection is mathematically an LQ-sized random sample taken from an N -sized
population without replacement, where the population contains a subset of fE entities that
are considered special. Then the probability that Eve controls k Tor routers in the Quorum
is given by the hypergeometric distribution, whose probability mass function (PMF) is
(fEk )(
N−fE
LQ−k)
( NLQ)
. Then the probability that LE >
LQ
2 is given by
LQ∑
x=dLQ
2
e
(
fE
k
)(
N−fE
LQ−k
)(
N
LQ
) . Odd
choices for LQ prevents the possibility of network disruption when the Quorum is evenly
split in terms of the current Page. We examine the probability of Eve’s success for increasing
amounts of fE in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The probability that Eve controls the majority of the Quorum is given by the
PMF of the hypergeometric distribution. We fix N at 5,400 nodes and graph Eve’s success
probability as a function of an increasing percentage of Eve-controlled colluding routers. We
examine five selections for LQ: 31, 63, 127, 255, and 511. We do not consider percentages
beyond 33 percent as those represent a near-complete compromise of the Tor network.
Figure 6.1 shows that a choice of LQ = 31 is suboptimal: the probabilities are above
the 10−38.532 threshold for even small levels of collusion. LQ = 63 likewise fails with
approximately two percent collusion, although choices of 127, 255, and 511 fail at levels
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above approximately 8, 16, and 25 percent, respectively. The figure also suggests that
larger Quorums are superior with respect to security. Small Quorums are also less resilient
to DDOS attacks at the Quorum in general.
If we assume that Eve controls 10 percent of the Tor network, then we can examine
the impact of the longevities of Quorums; over a fixed period of time, slower rotations
suggests a lower cumulative chance of selecting any malicious Quorum. If w is Eve’s chance
of compromise, then her cumulative chances of compromising any Quorum is given by
1−(1−2)t. This gives us a bound estimate on ∆q. We estimate this over 10 years in Figure
6.2.
Figure 6.2: The cumulative probability that Eve controls any Quorum at different rotation
rates. We assume 10 percent collusion in a network of 5400 Tor routers, and view across 10
years. We do not graph LQ values of 255 or 511 as they generate probabilities far below our
10−38.532 threshold; LQ = 255 and LQ = 511 produce values less than 10−58 and 10−134,
respectively.
Figure 6.2 suggests that while slow rotations (i.e a period of 7 days) generates orders
of magnitude less chance than fast rotations, the choice of LQ is far more significant. Like
Figure 6.1, it also shows that LQ = 31 and LQ = 61 are relatively poor choices.
If a selected Quorum is malicious, fast rotation rates will minimize the duration of any
disruptions, a contradiction to Figure 6.1. However, given the very low statistical likelihood
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of selecting a malicious Quorum, we consider this a minor contribution to the decision.
Although a malicious Quorum would have the capabilities to deploy a variety of attacks
on the network, the proper selections of LQ ≥ 127 and ∆q ≥ 1 reduces the likelihood of this
occurring to near-zero probabilities. We consider this a stronger solution than introducing
countermeasures to those attacks. However, the networking and performance load scales
linearly with Quorum size. Based on this balance and our above analysis, we suggest 127
or 255 for values of LQ and 7 or 14 for ∆q.
6.1.2 Entropy of Tor Consensus Documents
We use Tor’s consensus documents as a sources of entropy agreed upon by all parties,
however we have not yet demonstrated that the network status contains enough entropy
to provide reasonable assurance that Eve cannot guess the next Quorum in advance. If
Eve could predict future Quorums, Eve can subvert the Quorum Derivation protocol in a
variety of attack vectors. However, this would fail our security assumption against adaptive
compromise in the presence of OnioNS. Rather than introducing defenses against these
attack vectors, we nevertheless believe that ensuring sufficient entropy in the consensus
documents is a superior defense.
Periodically, Tor routers upload signed descriptors — routing information, crypto-
graphic keys, and other information — to Tor’s directory authorities (dirauths). Once per
hour, the dirauths aggregate and republish the descriptors back to the network, enabling
Tor’s network to be dynamic and distributing new information to all parties in an effi-
cient and timely manner. While Tor provides no guarantee that the network is using the
same consensus at the same time, the consensus is timestamped, so we can reference it
by their time of publication. We focus on two essential documents that clients assemble
from the consensus: cached-certs, a list of long-term identity and short-term signing RSA
keys from each dirauth; and cached-microdesc-consensus, essential information about each
router, such as networking information and capabilities. Since the dirauths publish a new
consensus every hour, we must analyse the entropy rate between consecutive hours.
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We constructed a first-order Markov model and estimated the entropy of the cached-
microdesc-consensus document by analysing the transitions for various fields between con-
secutive consensuses. We also provide analysis on the dynamics of the Tor network by
counting routers that enter or leave the Tor network between consecutive consensuses in
Figure 6.3. Here we identity routers by their identity keys; just as Tor does, we consider
routers that change their identity keys as two different routers; one leaving and one enter-
ing the network. Routers entering the network introduce significant amounts of information
into the consensus. For example, cached-microdesc-consensus contains the 160-bit SHA-1
hash of the router’s RSA-1024 identity key, which are generated through OpenSSL. Thus
new routers contribute at least 160 bits of information. Figure 6.3 suggests that we may
expect approximately 100 to 175 routers to leave or enter the network per hour. Thus we
may expect approximately 16,000 to 28,000 bits of entropy per hour from this dynamic.
Figure 6.3: A histogram of the number of routers entering or leaving the network between
consecutive consensuses across the seven-month period.
For routers that are present between consecutive pairs, we focus on six critical fields
from each router’s descriptor inside cached-microdesc-consensus: nickname, the router’s
name chosen by its operator or a default name; publication, the time when it last published
a descriptor; IP address, its network address; ORPort, the network port for onion routing;
version, the version of the Tor protocol that this relay is running; and bandwidth, as self-
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Figure 6.4: The number of observed transi-
tions for nickname, publication, IP address,
ORPort, version, and bandwidth between
consecutive consensuses across the seven-
month period.
Figure 6.5: The entropy rate distribu-
tion for each of the six fields in cached-
microdesc-consensus, scaled by the average
size of the Tor network.
reported or as measured by the dirauths. Tor routers change publication when either 18
hours has elapsed since the last descriptor publication, its fields have changed, or if its
uptime has been reset.
We obtained from collector.torproject.org 5,067 archived hourly publications of
cached-microdesc-consensus across a seven-month period between September 1, 2014 00:00
UTC and March 31, 2015 23:00 UTC. We construct a Markov model for the six afore-
mentioned fields and illustrate the number of observed transitions for each field in Figure
6.4.
Then the entropy rate is given by equation 6.1, where Pi is the probability of state i and
Pi(j) is the probability of state j given i (the i-j transition). We multiply the entropy rate by
the total number of routers in the Tor network. This assumes that router’s are independently
and uniformly distributed, but this is not always the case as small sets of routers may be
managed together and change as one. However, identifying these sets and analysing them
separately is non-trivial to impossible; administrators may operate anonymously or try to
purposely hide their management of multiple geographically-distance routers. Due to this,
this assumption results in an estimation of the entropy and not an exact value. We calculate
this rate estimation for each of the six fields and illustrate the results in Figure 6.5.
H(S) = −LT
∑
i
Pi
∑
j
Pi(j) log2 Pi(j) (6.1)
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The average size of the Tor network across the seven-month period was 6,672 routers,
thus together these fields contributed on average approximately 8,896.7 bits of entropy per
hour across our seven-month view. The two documents contain at least this much en-
tropy; our analysis does not comprehensively cover all the fields in cached-certs and cached-
microdesc-consensus, so other fields may also contribute additional information. Based on
this analysis, the approximately 16,000 to 28,000 entropy bits contributed hourly by routers
joining or entering the Tor network, and our previous statistical calculations, we conclude
that with LQ ≥ 127, the Quorum Formation protocol is secure under our design assump-
tions. Our analysis shows that the size and dynamic nature of the Tor network provides
the strongest defense against Quorum-level attacks.
Malicious Entropy Reduction
The Quorum Derivation protocol describes initializing the Mersenne Twister with a
384-bit seed. If we assume that Eve desires that the Quorum Derivation protocol produce a
Quorum pleasing to Eve (such as including her malicious routers in the Quorum or rejecting
specific honest routers from the Quorum) based on some hash k. As H(x) is SHA-384,
SHA-384’s strong resistance to preimage attack forces Eve to spend LT ∗ 2383 operations
on average to find k. Eve may also try to manipulate her router’s descriptors such that
H(cdq+1) = k, but SHA-384’s resistance to second-preimage attacks also requires this to
require LT ∗ 2383 operations as well. The number of operations involved in this attack
vector is significantly more than the operations involved in breaking AES, so we disregard
the possibility of manipulating the Quorum Derivation protocol in this way.
6.1.3 Sybil Attacks
Eve may also attempt to increase her probability of including her malicious nodes in
the Quorum via Sybil attacks. We offer no defense against this type of attack, although Tor
does. The attack is difficult to carry out in practice due to the slow build of trust within
the Tor network. Directory authorities would give Eve’s nodes the Fast and Stable flags
after weeks of continual uptime and a history of reliability. For large-scale Sybil attacks,
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this introduces a significant time and financial cost to Eve. We also note that choices of
LQ and ∆q also offer significant statistical defenses against Sybil attacks, as illustrated in
Figures 6.1 and 6.2, shown above.
6.1.4 Hidden Service Spoofing
OnioNS does not require a hidden service operator to reveal any personally-identifiable
information. Hidden services are only known by their public key and domain names, and we
assume that the hidden service is authentic. We have also observed spoofed hidden services
in the wild, suggesting that this problem already exists in Tor’s environment. We do not
introduce a reputation system or distributed verification system, and note that it is difficult
if not impossible to construct a reliable defense against hidden service spoofing attacks due
to their anonymous nature.
One possible solution, although it severely compromises anonymity, is to register a
hidden service with an SSL Certificate Authority and apply an SSL certificate to the server.
In this way, TLS communication provides an authenticity check against the hidden service,
although TLS also sets up a redundant encryption layer that may decrease performance.
However, in practice this solution is very rarely seen; out of approximately 25,000 hid-
den services [1] [2], to date only three hidden services have browser-trusted SSL certificates:
Blockchain.info at https://blockchainbdgpzk.onion, Facebook at https://facebookcorewwwi.onion,
and The Intercept’s SecureDrop instance at https://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion. In future work
we may study the security implications of signing the .onion address or the .tor OnioNS do-
main name. Due to their severe privacy concerns and the security controversy surrounding
the centralized CA Chain of Trust, generally speaking we do not recommend the application
of SSL certificates to Tor hidden services.
6.1.5 Outsourcing Record Proof-of-Work
The Record Generation protocol can safely take place within an offline machine under
the operator’s control. We designed the Record Generation protocol with the objective of
requiring the hidden service operator to also perform the scrypt proof-of-work. However,
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our protocol does not entirely prevent the operator from outsourcing the computation to
secondary resource in all cases.
Let Bob be the hidden service operator, and let Craig be a secondary computational
resource. We assume that Craig does not have Bob’s private key. Then,
1. Bob creates an initial Record R and completes the type, name, nameList, contact, and
consensusHash fields.
2. Bob sends R to Craig. Let central be type‖name‖nameList‖contact‖consensusHash‖
nonce.
3. Craig generates a random integer K and then for each iteration j from 0 to K,
(a) Craig increments nonce.
(b) Craig sets PoW as PoW(central).
(c) Craig saves the new R as Cj .
4. Craig sends all C0≤j≤K to Bob.
5. For each Record C0≤j≤K Bob computes
(a) Bob sets pubHSKey to his public RSA key.
(b) Bob sets recordSig to SRSA(m, r) where m = central ‖pow and r is Bob’s private
RSA key.
(c) Bob has found a valid record if H(central ‖ pow ‖ recordSig) ≤ 2difficulty
Our protocol ensures that Craig must always compute more scrypt iterations than
necessary; Craig cannot generate recordSig and thus cannot compute if the hash is below
the threshold. Moreover, the scrypt work incurs a cost onto Craig that must be compensated
financially by Bob. Thus the Record Generation protocol places a lower bound on the cost
paid by Bob.
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6.1.6 DNS Leakage
Human mistakes can also compromise user privacy. One such security threat is the
accidental leakage of .tor lookups over the Internet DNS. This vulnerability is not limited
to OnioNS and applies to any alternative DNS; users may mistakenly attempt lookups
over the traditional Internet DNS. Mohaisen and Thomas observed .onion lookups on root
DNS servers at a frequency that corresponded to external global events, highlighting the
human factor in those leakages [30]. For OnioNS, this may occur if their client software
was not properly configured, if their browser was not properly configured to or could not
communicate with Tor, or for other reasons. We offer no defense against this attack vector
and note that any defense against it would need to introduce lookup whitelists or blacklists
into common browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer to prevent them
from attempting lookups for pseudo-TLDs.
6.2 Objectives Assessment
OnioNS achieves all of our original requirements. OnioNS Records do not contain
any personal or location information and the PGP key is optional and can be anonymous.
OnioNS performs Domain and Onion Queries through Tor circuits, so resolvers cannot
sufficiently distinguish users to track their lookups. The system uses self-signed Records
and a Merkle tree to provide end-to-end authentication, which the client can obtain in a
single query with lightweight bandwidth and CPU costs. Everyone holding the Pagechain
can verify that the Records are unique and reject the introduction of collisions. The system
is distributed throughout the Tor network and the selection of authoritative Quorum nodes
is random and temporary, decreasing the load, responsibility, and attack potential for any
single node. OnioNS is an optional add-on to Tor, so the system is backwards compatible.
Finally, as we demonstrate in the next chapter, OnioNS is also easy-to-use as it loads a
hidden service transparently and without requiring any input from the user.
We therefore believe that we have squared Zooko’s Triangle; OnioNS is distributed,
enables hidden service operators to select human-meaningful domain names, and domain
names are guaranteed unique by the network.
54
CHAPTER 7
IMPLEMENTATION
7.1 Reference Implementation
Alongside this publication, we provide a reference implementation of OnioNS. We uti-
lize C++11, the Botan cryptographic library, the Standard Template Library’s (STL) im-
plementation of Mersenne Twister, and the libjsoncpp-dev library for JSON encoding. We
develop in Linux Mint and compile for Ubuntu Vivid, Utopic, Trusty, and their derivatives.
Our software is built on Canonical’s Launchpad online build system and is available online
on Github.
7.2 Prototype Design
We have developed an OnioNS prototype that implements the Record Generation and
Domain Query protocols. In this initial prototype, we use a static server and a hidden
service that we deployed at onions55e7yam27n.onion. We constructed a Record containing
an association between “example.tor” and “onions55e7yam27n.onion”. Next, we transmit
this Record to the server over a Tor circuit. Finally, we modified Tor such that the following
procedures occur client-side as illustrated in Figure 7.1:
1. The user enters in “example.tor” into the Tor Browser.
2. The Tor Browser sends “example.tor” to Tor’s SOCKS port for resolution.
3. The Tor client intercepts “*.tor”, places the lookup in a wait state, and sends “exam-
ple.tor” to the OnioNS client over a named pipe.
4. The OnioNS client connects to the static OnioNS server over a Tor circuit and performs
a Domain Query.
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5. The server responds with the Create Record containing “example.tor”.
6. The client writes “onions55e7yam27n.onion” to the Tor client over another named
pipe.
7. The Tor client resumes the lookup and rewrites the original “example.tor” lookup
with “onions55e7yam27n.onion”.
8. The Tor client contacts the OnioNS hidden service and passes the webpage to the Tor
Browser.
9. The Tor Browser displays the website contents and preserves the “example.tor” do-
main name.
Tor Network
  
Tor        
Client
  
OnioNS 
Client
Tor 
Browser
  
OnioNS 
Server
Hidden 
Service
Figure 7.1: The overview of our OnioNS prototype. The Tor Browser passes an unknown
.tor domain to the OnioNS through the Tor software (red) which resolves the domain anony-
mously over a Tor circuit (orange) to a remote resolver. Finally, the Tor software contacts
the hidden service in the traditional way. (green) The Tor Browser communicates to the
Tor client over its SOCKS port, while the OnioNS client communicates over named pipes
(red) and Tor’s SOCKS port (orange).
Tor performs asynchronously here; it must place the lookup on hold, free its event loop
to avoid a deadlock, and asynchronously resume the lookup once it receives the response.
From the user’s perspective, the content of http://onions55e7yam27n.onion loads trans-
parently under the http://example.tor URL.
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7.2.1 Challenges
We encountered two significant challenges while implementing the prototype.
Our first modification to the Tor software used blocking I/O for communication with
the OnioNS client. This caused Tor’s event loop to pause while the OnioNS was resolving
the domain name. When the OnioNS client attempted to use Tor to construct a circuit to
the OnioNS server, Tor could not respond as it was waiting on I/O. This resulted in an
unresolvable deadlock. After collaboration with several Tor developers we migrated our Tor
modification to libevent, a software library that enables asynchronous event. Libevent is
heavily used throughout Tor, Google Chrome, ntpd, and other software. Libevent enabled
the OnioNS client to communicate over Tor, communicate with the remote OnioNS resolver,
and return the hidden service address to Tor. Libevent then fired a callback method to
contact the hidden service.
Our second challenge was telling Tor to place the resolution of the domain on hold.
Previously, Tor would attempt to interpret the .tor domain and fail the lookup almost
instantaneously. To resolve this, we placed the resolution in a waiting state. Then when
OnioNS resolved the domain, our Libevent callback resumed the lookup, passed in the
initial state, and allowed the lookup to continue as if a hidden service address had been
requested in the first place. This allowed the Tor Browser to view the destination hidden
service under a .tor domain name.
7.2.2 Performance
We conducted several performance measurements for the Record Generation and Do-
main Query protocols. Our experiment involves two machines, A and B. Machine A has an
Intel Core2 Quad Q9000 (Penryn architecture) @ 2.00 GHz CPU from late 2008 and Ma-
chine B has an Intel i7-2600K (Sandy Bridge architecture) @ 4.3 GHz CPU from 2011. We
chose machines with this hardware in order to represent low-end and medium-end consumer-
grade computers, respectively. To minimize latency on our end, both machines were hosted
on 1 Gbits connections at Utah State University. We hosted our hidden service and TCP
server on Machine B. Then on Machine A, we measured the time required to connect to
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our hidden service over OnioNS and over the more direct hidden service protocol.
We selected the parameters of scrypt such that it consumed 128 MB of RAM during
operation. We consider this an affordable amount of RAM for low-end consumer-grade
computers. We created a multi-threaded implementation of the Record Generation protocol
and used all eight virtual CPU cores on Machine B to generate our Record. As expected,
our RAM consumption scaled linearly with the number of scrypt instances executed in
parallel; we observed approximately 1 GB of RAM consumption during Record Generation.
We set the difficulty of the Create Record such that the Record Generation protocol took
only a few minutes on average to conduct, but in the future we may change it so that the
protocol takes several hours instead.
Processing Time
We measured the CPU wall time required for different parts of client-side protocols.
We measured how long it takes the client to build a Record from a JSON-formatted textual
string, which involves parsing and assembly of the various fields; the time to check the
proof-of-work PoW, and the time to check the recordSig digital signature.
Description A Time (ms) B Time (ms) Samples
Parsing JSON into a Record 0.052 0.0238 100
Scrypt check 896.369 589.926 25
Check of Sd(m, r) RSA signature 0.06304 0.0267 200
Machine B, as expected, performed much faster than Machine A at all of these tasks.
Parsing and signature checks both took trivial time, though the total time was dominated
by the single iteration of scrypt. Record Validation protocol is single threaded and consumes
128 MB of RAM due to scrypt.
Latency
We compared the load latency between an OnioNS domain name with a traditional
hidden service address. Our tests measured the time between when a user entered in
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“example.tor” into the Tor Browser to the time when the browser first began to load our
hidden service webpage. We also tested http://onions55e7yam27n.onion, the destination
of “example.tor”. We performed our experiment 15 times with a different client-side Tor
circuit for each by restarting Tor at each iteration. To prevent browser-side caching, we
restarted the Tor Browser between tests as well.
Lookup Fastest Time Slowest Time Mean Time
.tor 6.1 8.5 7.1
.onion 9.3 12.2 10.2
The latency is circuit-dependent and heavily depends on the speed of each Tor router
and the distance between them. To avoid the latency cost whenever possible, we imple-
mented a DNS cache into the OnioNS client-side software to allow subsequent queries to be
resolved locally, avoiding unnecessary remote lookups.
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK
In future work we will expand our implementation of OnioNS and develop the remaining
protocols. While our implementation functions with a fixed resolver, we will deploy our
implementation onto larger and more realistic simulation environments such as Chutney and
PlanetLab. When we have completed dynamic functionality and the remaining protocols, we
will pursuit integrating our implementation into Tor. We expect this to be straightforward
as OnioNS is designed as a plugin for Tor, introduces no changes to Tor’s hidden service
protocol, and requires very few changes to Tor’s software. In future developments, Tor’s
developers may also make significant changes to Tor’s hidden services, but OnioNS’ design
enables our system to become forwards-compatible after a few minor changes.
Additionally, several questions need to be answered in future studies:
• Should the Quorum expire registrations that point to non-existent hidden services,
and if so, how can this be done securely?
• How can we reduce vulnerability to phishing/spoofing attacks? Can OnioNS be
adapted to include a privacy-enhanced reputation system?
• How can OnioNS support domain names with international encodings? A na¨ıve ap-
proach to this is to simply support UTF-16, though care must also be taken to prevent
phishing attacks by domain names that use Unicode characters that visually appear
very similar.
• What other networks can OnioNS apply to? We require a fully-connected networked
and an global source of entropy. We encourage the community to adapt our work to
other systems that fit these requirements.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
We have introduced OnioNS, a Tor-powered distributed DNS that maps unique .tor
domain names to traditional Tor .onion addresses. It enables hidden service operators
to select a human-meaningful domain name and provide access to their service through
that domain. We preserve the privacy and anonymity of both parties during registration,
maintenance, and lookup, and furthermore allow Tor clients to verify the authenticity of
domain names. Moreover, we rely heavily upon existing Tor infrastructure, which simplifies
our design assumptions and narrows our threat model largely to attack vectors already
well-understood throughout the Tor literature.
We use the Pagechain distributed data structure to prevent disagreements from forming
within the network. Furthermore, every participant can verify the uniqueness of domain
names. The Pagechain also has a fixed maximal length, which places an upper bound on
the networking, computational, and storage requirements for all participants, a valuable
efficiency gain especially noticeable long-term.
OnioNS achieves all three properties of Zooko’s Triangle: it is distributed, allows hid-
den service operators to select meaningful domain names, and all parties can confirm for
themselves the uniqueness of domain names in the database. We provide a reference im-
plementation in C++ that should enable Tor developers to deploy OnioNS into the Tor
network with minimal effort. We believe that OnioNS will be a useful abstraction layer
that will significantly enhance the usability and the popularity of Tor hidden services.
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